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 This research paper examines the roles of communities in the effective 
reintegration of violent extremist offenders in the Lake Chad Basin countries, including 
Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, and Chad. It is important to examine the effectiveness of 
reintegration in the Lake Chad Basin region, particularly because of its unique context in 
the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration field (DDR). This unique context is 
unlike traditional DDR environments because of the emerging need to reintegrate 
individuals during a fragile security environment with an ongoing counterterrorism 
campaign. This paper utilizes a mixed-methods approach by providing a case study on 
each of the countries’ community roles within reintegration and then by comparing and 
measuring the cases against one another and against a success and challenge indicator 
checklist. The goal of comparing these cases and measuring them against the checklists is 
to showcase the essential components of reintegration programs and the positive roles 
and pitfalls of communities that may be useful for future effective programming in this 
emerging field. The results of the case studies prove that communities have not been fully 
utilized within reintegration programs in the Lake Chad Basin region which has led to 
ineffective reintegration processes. However, communities in the region have played a 
large role within informal methods of reintegration. At the same time, communities have 
played a significant challenging role towards effective reintegration of Boko Haram 
violent extremist offenders. Based on the findings from the case studies, this paper also 
includes recommendations to inform of ways communities can be utilized to increase the 
effectiveness of reintegrating VEOs.   
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At the peak of its violence, Boko Haram, a violent terrorist group active in West Africa,  
was known as the deadliest group in the world, having killed around 6,600 people in 2014.1 
Boko Haram originated in northeast Nigeria and then spread throughout the Lake Chad Basin 
(LCB) region into neighboring Chad, Cameroon, and Niger (as seen in Figure 1). Throughout 
history, the border regions of the four countries have experienced increased marginalization, 
poverty, and an absence of state authority.2 These factors helped Boko Haram rise to power and 
recruit individuals from the Lake’s communities, due to their dissatisfaction with the state. 
Despite many community members joining the group, these communities have suffered 
significantly at the hands of Boko Haram.3 The Boko Haram conflict has directly impacted over 
21 million people, and internally displaced over 2.6 million people within the LCB countries, as 
of October 2017.4 Communities throughout this region have been torn apart and traumatized by 
the terrorist group. Since its peak in 2015, Boko Haram has suffered many losses due to the 
region’s military campaign against the group, even though the group still remains active. As the 
group has been experiencing losses, many of its members have become disillusioned and are 
beginning to leave the group. According to the LCB’s Multinational Joint Task Force, it is 
estimated that around 3,500 Boko Haram violent extremist offenders (VEOs) have surrendered 
 
1 Idayat Hassan and Justin Tyvoll, After Boko Haram: Prospects for Transitional Justice in Northeast 
Nigeria, report, Center for Democracy and Development, July 2018, https://cddelibrary.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/After Boko Haram Prospects for Transitional Justice in the North East .pdf: 8.  
2 Saibou Issa and Nadine Machikou, Reintegrating Former Boko Haram Associates: Perspectives from Far North 
Region in Cameroon, report, Global Center on Cooperative Security, February 2019, , 
https://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/GCCS-PB-Reintegrating-Former-Boko-Haram-
Associates-2019.pdf: 3.  
3 Fighting Boko Haram in Chad: Beyond Military Measures, report, International Crisis Group, March 8, 2017, 
https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/chad/246-fighting-boko-haram-chad-beyond-military-measures. 
4 Fonteh Akum, The Reintegration Enigma: Interventions for Boko Haram Deserters in the Lake Chad Basin, report, 
Institute for Security Studies, October 2018, , https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/car13.pdf: 4.  
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and are ready to enter reintegration processes.5 As of right now, the LCB countries are grappling 
with how to reintegrate these VEOs within an ongoing counterterrorism campaign against Boko 
Haram. Community involvement within reintegration programming has proven to ensure the 
successful reintegration of ex-combatants in the past.6 However, in the case of the LCB region, 
these communities have been deeply affected by the conflict.  
Based on the above, this research study aims to explore answers to the following: What 
role do communities play in the effectiveness of reintegration programs of violent extremist 
offenders (VEOs) in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) countries including Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, 
and Chad? For ease of reference, definitions of key terms mentioned throughout this paper are 
outlined in Appendix 1. 
This research study will utilize a mixed methods approach, including examining country 
case studies and comparing the roles communities have had on the effectiveness of reintegration 
programming in the LCB countries. In terms of this paper, effective reintegration is defined as 
when VEOs can rejoin their communities in a safe manner and are able to reintegrate socially, 
politically, and economically. Effective reintegration also ensures that the needs of the recipient 
communities, as well the needs of the individual, are considered and met proportionately. A safe 
manner is defined as the ability of violent extremist offenders to reenter communities without 
facing violent retribution, as well as the basic security needs of communities are met. This 
process of effective reintegration also encompasses the success indicators outlined in a checklist 
in Appendix 2 and the challenge indicators outlined in a checklist in Appendix 3. These 
checklists will be applied to the case studies of the LCB countries, in order to provide a snapshot 
 
5 Ibid, 3.  
6 Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards, report, United 
Nations, 2014, http://unddr.org/uploads/documents/Operational Guide.pdf: 172.  
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to better understand the role communities can play in the effectiveness of reintegrating VEOs in 
the LCB.  
It is important to examine the effectiveness of reintegration in the LCB region, 
particularly because of its unique context in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration 
field (DDR). This unique context is unlike traditional DDR environments because of the 
emerging need to reintegrate individuals during a fragile security environment with an ongoing 
counterterrorism campaign. Reintegration is typically the most complex component of DDR 
campaigns, and showcasing this unique security context, including the reintegration of VEOs 
into conflict-affected communities can shed some light for future DDR interventions in this 
context.7 The goal of comparing these cases and measuring them against the checklists is to 
showcase the essential components of reintegration programs and the positive roles and pitfalls 
of communities that may be useful for future effective programming in this emerging field. 
Based on the findings from the case studies, this paper will also include recommendations to 
inform of ways communities can be utilized to increase the effectiveness of reintegrating VEOs.   
     Figure 1: Map of the Lake Chad Basin countries8  
 
7 Saskia Brechenmacher, Achieving Peace in Northeast Nigeria: The Reintegration Challenge, report, Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, September 5, 2018, https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/09/05/achieving-
peace-in-northeast-nigeria-reintegration-challenge-pub-77177. 
8 Al Jazeera, "Chad Troops Kill 17 Boko Haram Fighters after Lake Chad Attack," News | Al Jazeera, September 29, 








In order to better understand the role of communities in the effectiveness of reintegration 
programs in the Lake Chad basin countries, we must first look at the broader scope and evolution 
of DDR literature, as well as the scholarship on the varying roles that communities have played 
in reintegration programs worldwide. Furthermore, we must explore the existing literature on the 
reintegration of VEOs within ongoing counterterrorism contexts to better assess how the 
involvement of communities can affect reintegration processes in this vastly different security 
environment than which DDR was originally expected to be implemented in. Since the LCB 
countries are still experiencing ongoing counterterrorism campaigns, it is important to examine 
the schools of thought relating to reintegration and community involvement within this particular 
insecure environment in order to assess how communities can play a role in the effectiveness of 
reintegrating Boko Haram VEOs into their communities.  
 
Traditional DDR School of Thought 
 
After the conclusion of the Cold War and the cessation of many proxy wars globally, the 
internationalized concept of DDR programming came about with specific guidelines on how to 
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create an ‘effective’ program.9 As conflicts terminated, peace agreements included a DDR 
component, particularly focusing on state militias of a civil war.10 Since DDR programs were 
being enacted once a peace agreement was signed, there was a guaranteed basic level of security 
within the state, which is vastly different than the environments DDR is currently being 
implemented in. The disarmament and demobilization portions of traditional DDR interventions 
concentrated on disarming combatants and breaking down the command and control structures 
between militias’ rank and file officers.11 
However, within this school of thought, scholars and practitioners often neglected the 
reintegration component of DDR, instead solely focusing on the military aspects of disarmament 
and demobilization.12 A significant weakness within these programs was that there was no clear 
strategy on how to reintegrate ex-combatants back into their communities after demobilization. If 
reintegration was mentioned at all, it exclusively focused on the ex-combatant as an individual 
and completely disregarded the needs and opinions of the recipient community. Throughout this 
school, any methods of reintegration were solely directed on economically reintegrating ex-
combatants via providing small stipends, micro-grants, or vocational training, which was often 
not contextually relevant to the economic needs of the country.13 As seen in an article by Kees 
Kingma on the demobilization of combatants after civil wars in Africa, many programs regarded 
reintegration support as simply providing a package of cash to assist in their resettlement.14 By 
 
9 Dean Piedmont, "The Role of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) in Countering Violent 
Extremism," Center for Security Studies, June 22, 2015: 1.  
10 Ibid, 3.  
11 Robert Muggah and Chris O’Donnell, "Next Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration," 
Stability: International Journal of Security & Development 4, no. 1 (2015): doi:10.5334/sta.fs: 2. 
12 Piedmont, "The Role of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) in Countering Violent 
Extremism”: 3.  
13 Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Compendium of Projects 2010-2017, report, International 
Organization for Migration, 2019, , https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/ddr_compendium.pdf: 4.  
14 Kees Kingma, "Demobilization of Combatants after Civil Wars in Africa and Their Reintegration into Civilian 
Life," Policy Sciences 30, no. 3 (August 1997), doi: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004215705156: 154.  
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providing cash stipends and economic assistance to ex-combatants, communities typically began 
to resent these former fighters as they were seen as receiving unnecessary rewards in a resource 
scarce environment.15  
Despite the lack of a reintegration focus within the traditional school, many scholars and 
practitioners would still note that reintegration efforts were the ultimate challenge in the overall 
DDR process.16 During the late 1990s, practitioners began to state that DDR programs were not 
as successful on the ground because of the lack of reintegration planning designed from the 
beginning. As seen in the case of Namibia, it was assumed that after demobilization ex-
combatants would merely return to their communities and pick up the lives they had before the 
war, which led to zero reintegration planning.17 At the same time, there is no mention of how the 
recipient communities, who most likely experienced trauma and atrocities during the conflict, 
would take in the former combatants. In addition to the lack of reintegration planning, Namibian 
ex-combatants were provided economic resources after demobilizing, which further exacerbated 
tensions vis-à-vis the recipient communities.18 In an article on this case study, Rosemary Preston 
describes how Namibia was overall seen as a success story of DDR, but this is because 
reintegration and communities’ needs were not seen as essential to its success, instead the 
effectiveness of the program was measured mainly on the disarmament and demobilization 
portions.19 
The traditional school provides a basic background on how DDR programs have 
primarily been designed, including the desire to be implemented in a more peaceful and secure 
 
15 Ibid, 162.  
16Ibid, 155.  
17 Rosemary Preston, "Integrating Fighters after War: Reflections on the Namibian Experience, 1989–1993," Journal 
of Southern African Studies 23, no. 3 (1997): doi:10.1080/03057079708708550. 
18 Ibid.  
19 Ibid.  
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environment after a peace agreement. However, this school is completely lacking in contextually 
relevant reintegration planning, as well as addressing the needs of recipient and conflict-affected 
communities. At the same time, DDR programming was exclusively a top-down approach with 
zero community involvement in the process. In addition, traditional DDR was only focused on 
the economic reintegration of ex-combatants with no regard for the social reintegration of 
individuals back into their communities, which often led to unsuccessful programs and 
unintended consequences, such as an intense resentment of ex-combatants for receiving 
economic assistance. Within this school of thought there is no mention of community 
involvement or efforts, which showcases that the absence of accounting for recipient 
communities’ needs and ownership can lead to significant issues during reintegration.  
 
Second Generation DDR School of Thought 
 
 Along with the international community recognizing the faults of traditional DDR, a 
second generation of thinking emerged in the early 2000s that shifted the focus more towards the 
reintegration component and community involvement in DDR. This school of thought was 
spurred in response to earlier DDR campaigns’ inability to effectively implement the 
reintegration component and in turn not achieving sustainable peace.20 Scholars and 
implementers began to shift their focus away from only looking at the individual to inclusively 
looking at communities in hopes of creating an enabling environment for DDR to occur where 
both the individual and community are beneficiaries of such initiatives.21 However, these DDR 
interventions, including in Sierra Leone and Liberia, still occurred through an official peace 
 
20 Piedmont, "The Role of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) in Countering Violent 




agreement, where a basic level of security was achieved prior to implementation. Second 
generation practices also still aimed to achieve the same goals of traditional DDR which included 
supporting a peace agreement, creating political spaces, and maintaining a secure environment.22 
 A monumental achievement of second generation thinkers was that DDR interventions 
were now expected to promote reconciliation between soldiers and conflict-affected 
communities, while at the same time still supporting the economic reintegration of ex-
combatants as seen in traditional DDR.23 The ultimate goal here was to ensure that sustainable 
peace was being fostered through community reconciliation and restorative justice. Programs 
began to be designed based on the needs of communities as well as the needs of ex-combatants, 
which often helped mitigate resentments against those reintegrating and prevented tensions from 
resurfacing.24 By including communities in the reintegration process, programs were able to 
build a better sense of trust and reconciliation allowing for an enabling environment for 
reintegration.25 
 At the core of second generation thinking is the United Nations Integrated DDR 
Standards, a document that provides guidelines on DDR programming and discusses the 
preconditions that are needed to ensure an effective implementation of DDR within 
peacekeeping environments. These preconditions include a signed peace agreement providing a 
legal framework, overall trust in the peace process, willingness of parties to comply, and a basic 
level of security.26 However influential the IDDRS was, and still is, the current conflict 
 
22 Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) Practices in Peace Operations: 
Contribution to the New Horizon Discussion on Challenges and Opportunities for UN Peacekeeping, publication, 
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Section, United Nations, 2010, , 
https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/2gddr_eng_with_cover.pdf: 3.  
23 Muggah and O’Donnell, "Next Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration”: 2. 
24 Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Compendium of Projects 2010-2017, 5.   
25 Ibid.  
26 Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) Practices in Peace Operations: 4.  
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environments of the world do not guarantee that these preconditions will exist once ex-
combatants are ready to reintegrate. A key takeaway from the IDDRS noted that economic 
reintegration is helpful, but it is not sufficient enough for sustainable reintegration; instead the 
IDDRS promoted social and political reintegration, which it referenced as community-based 
reintegration.27  
Overall, second generation thinking attempted to address the many issues with 
reintegration by promoting the inclusivity of communities in the process, but according to some 
scholars like Jeremy Weinstein and Macartan Humphreys reintegration was still missing the 
mark despite community involvement.28 For instance, DDR programs in practice were still 
pushing ex-combatants into communities with stipends without ensuring that they have a strong 
social network to reintegrate into.29 They discussed how even though the case of Sierra Leone’s 
DDR program was viewed as highly successful, around 6% of ex-combatants had severe issues 
reintegrating back into communities.30 When examining the case further they understood this to 
have been caused by a lack of acceptance by the recipient communities.31 This showcases that 
communities can sometimes have a negative impact on the effectiveness of reintegration. Second 
generation thinking was impactful in changing how reintegration is implemented on the ground 
and how the involvement of communities is considered, yet this generation’s thinking quickly 
became outdated to the evolving security environment including that of VEOs, terrorism, and 
countering violent extremism (CVE).  
 
Third Generation DDR School of Thought 
 
27 Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards, 157.   
28 Jeremy M. Weinstein and Macartan Humphreys, "Disentangling the Determinants of Successful Demobilization 
and Reintegration," Center for Global Development 69 (September 2005): , 
https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/4155_file_WP_69_0.pdf: 3.  
29 Ibid.   
30 Ibid, 4.  




 As the nature of conflict has changed around the world, a new form of DDR practices and 
theory emerged that concentrated more on incorporating the expanding issues of terrorism and 
CVE into DDR interventions. Third Generation DDR shifted the focus from implementing 
programs after peace agreements towards attempting to simultaneously run programs in a fragile 
security context, typically while having to reintegrate radicalized individuals back into 
communities.32 Within this school, the IDDRS is considered outdated, appearing inadequate to 
tackle the many challenges reintegration was now facing.33  
 The Africa Center for Strategic Studies presented its research on lessons learned and 
limits of DDR in Africa stating that reintegration continues to be the most “complex and critical 
yet least prioritized facet of DDR”.34 It is generally the phase that most individuals return back to 
militancy or terrorism.35 Many owe this to implementation delays and the inability of ex-
combatants to reintegrate back into their communities. Taking the second generation’s shift 
towards communities a little further, third generation thinking predominantly focuses on the 
social reintegration of ex-combatants including rebuilding bonds with recipient communities and 
increasing community ownership throughout the process.36 This school began to note that in 
many cases ineffective reintegration was often a result of recipient communities being 
misinformed, suspicious, or at times outright resistant towards reintegration due to the grave 
violence they experienced at the hands of these combatants.37 
 
32 Piedmont, "The Role of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) in Countering Violent 
Extremism”: 2.   
33 Muggah and O’Donnell, "Next Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration”: 4-5. 
34 Prosper Nzekani Zena, "The Lessons and Limits of DDR in Africa," Africa Security Brief, January 2013, , 
accessed May 23, 2019, https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ASB24EN-The-Lessons-and-Limits-
of-DDR-in-Africa.pdf: 1.  
35 Ibid, 3.  
36 Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Compendium of Projects 2010-2017, 5.   
37 Zena, "The Lessons and Limits of DDR in Africa,": 3.  
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 Notwithstanding the great strengths of the third generation school of thought, many of its 
scholars struggle with turning their research into policies that can guide successful practice on 
the ground, particularly with the integration of CVE.38 For example, some have suggested that 
there needs to be a shift towards incorporating CVE and DDR in programs, while at the same 
placing communities at the center of the reintegration process of these former VEOs.39 This 
becomes difficult to achieve in cases of ongoing counterterrorism operations, where governments 
cannot be transparent with communities due to security concerns. Many scholars within this 
school of thought argue whether or not DDR programs should also address the push factors that 
drive individuals to become radicalized and join terrorist groups in the first place, which in turn 
usually brings up the grievances of the wider community.40 This creates a need for a multifaceted 
approach to reintegration. Scholars Alpaslan Özerdem and Sukanya Podder stress the need to 
socially reintegrate VEOs via their families and communities which in turn can prevent these 
individuals from falling back into violent extremism.41  
Despite the adaptability of the third generation school of thought to the current conflict 
environment, DDR programs are still not necessarily best designed to handle the reintegration of 
VEOS, due to the lack of clear policy guidance. For example, since ongoing counterterrorism 
operations are usually occurring simultaneously with reintegration, there is typically a lack of 
transparency for civilians on reintegration processes. This lack of transparency often causes 
mistrust by communities and restricts any community involvement. Both the lack of 
 
38 Piedmont, "The Role of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) in Countering Violent 
Extremism”: 2.  
39 Ibid, 3.  
40Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Compendium of Projects 2010-2017, 5.   
41 Alpaslan Özerdem and Sukanya Podder, "Disarming Youth Combatants: Mitigating Youth Radicalization and 
Violent Extremism," Journal of Strategic Security 4, no. 4 (2011): , doi:10.5038/1944-0472.4.4.3.: 71.  
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transparency, as well as the nature of terrorist violence, has led to increased stigmas of returning 
VEOs, in which third generation thinking has not yet identified how best to address.42 
 
Existing Literature on Community Involvement in Reintegration 
 
In order to understand the roles communities can play in the effectiveness of reintegration 
programs of VEOS in the LCB countries, we must examine existing literature on community 
involvement in reintegration. Scholarship on community involvement in reintegration programs 
assumes that if the recipient communities participate in the implementation of reintegration 
programs then it can help reduce misconceptions and stigmas surrounding the return of ex-
combatants.43 As seen in the above schools, reintegration programs often do not account for the 
contextual realities or local practices and often apply one size fits all approaches to different 
interventions. One form of community involvement is the need to have community reconciliation 
with ex-combatants during the reintegration process. It is important to utilize traditional and 
contextually relevant restorative justice methods to ensure that the reintegration of ex-
combatants is more successful within that community. Katerina Werkman explains that 
community reconciliation can often be completed through these traditional ceremonies, as they 
can support the restoration of relationships, forge cohesion within communities, and even help in 
the reintegration of ex-combatants as a symbolic acceptance of past wrongs.44 For example, in 
 
42 Akum, The Reintegration Enigma, 11. 
43 Stefan Astrom and Bengt Ljunggren, DDR and Community Based Integration – How to Mitigate Stigmatisation of 
Former Combatants, report, Folke Bernadotte Academy, April 2016, , 
https://fba.se/contentassets/c32c8c19b653446983ba748d844ff800/ddr_brief_final.pdf: 10.   
44 Katerina Werkman, "Seeking Community Reconciliation Through Traditional Ceremonies," Central European 
Journal of International & Security Studies, February 2014: 126.  
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Mozambique traditional ceremonies that included rites of purification and cleansing were a key 
aspect of reintegrating ex-combatants into their communities.45 
In some cases, the reintegration of ex-combatants into communities can be dangerous for the 
ex-combatant due to either vigilante justice or violent resentment exhibited by communities. 
These negative roles of communities often create ineffective reintegration programs since one of 
the main goals of reintegration is the safe transition of individuals into their communities.46  
Even though most scholarship recognizes the positive impact of communities on 
reintegration programs, some argue there is a gray area of how much the community should 
participate in these processes and what their role should necessarily be.47 Due to this, it is 
important for new scholarship to focus on understanding the role of communities in reintegration 
of VEOs in the LCB. For instance, community-based reintegration has become a growing 
interest of DDR practitioners, but there remains little empirical evidence on the elements of 
community involvement in the social reintegration of ex-combatants, let alone many specific 
case studies.48 Specifically, the concept of reintegration in the security context of terrorism and 
violent extremism is not a standardized concept in existing literature.49 
 
Gaps in Existing Literature and Correcting these Shortcomings 
 
 As discussed throughout the literature review, reintegration is considered the most critical 
part of DDR programming, yet it is the least prioritized when implementation occurs, often not 
 
45 Ibid, 117.  
46 Christina Nemr et al., It Takes A Village: An Action Agenda on the Role of Civil Society in the Rehabilitation and 
Reintegration of Those Associated With and Affected by Violent Extremism, report, Global Center on Cooperative 
Security, August 2018, https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/GC_It-Takes-a-Village_WEB.pdf: 1.  
47 Meredith Rossner and Jasmine Bruce, "Community Participation in Restorative Justice: Rituals, Reintegration, 
and Quasi-Professionalization," Victims & Offenders 11, no. 1 (2016): doi:10.1080/15564886.2015.1125980: 108.  
48 Oliver Kaplan and Enzo Nussio, "Community Counts: The Social Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in 
Colombia," SSRN Electronic Journal, March 1, 2012, doi:10.2139/ssrn.2138188: 133, 135.  
49 Nemr et al., It Takes A Village:1.  
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accounting for contextual realities and local needs.50 Existing literature does not provide clear 
guidance on how to reintegrate individuals into communities in practice, specifically VEOs, 
which in turn has led to ineffective approaches on the ground, sometimes resulting in worse-case 
scenarios.51 At the same time, current reintegration methods often do not recognize the 
importance of  involving communities into programs to ensure the effective social reintegration 
of VEOs.52 This paper will aim to examine the role communities play in the effectiveness of 
reintegration programs of Boko Haram VEOs in the LCB countries. Based on past literature, it is 
clear that community involvement and ownership can play an impactful role, however existing 
literature is severely lacking on guidelines on how to integrate these VEOs into communities that 
were impacted by terrorism and its destabilizing consequences. In addition, this paper aims to 
add specific case studies and assessments of the LCB countries’ reintegration programs to better 
understand how conflict-impacted communities are involved in VEOs’ reintegration in the 
region. In hopes of adding contextually relevant research to existing literature on the gaps of 
reintegration research of VEOs in the LCB, this paper will enable program implementers to be 
able to better incorporate communities within the process and capitalize on their positive roles 
within reintegration programs to ensure more effective programming.   
Hypothesis and Methodology 
 
 Based on the above gaps in the existing literature, this research study aims to explore the 
following: What role do communities play in the effectiveness of reintegration programs of 
VEOs in the LCB countries including Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, and Chad?  
 
50 Zena, "The Lessons and Limits of DDR in Africa,": 1. 
51 Piedmont, "The Role of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) in Countering Violent 
Extremism”: 2-3.  




 This research question will be examined through a mixed methods approach of 
examining individual country case studies and then comparing the impact communities have on 
effective reintegration programming in the LCB region. For this paper, effective reintegration is 
defined as when VEOs can rejoin their communities in a safe manner and are able to reintegrate 
socially, politically, and economically. Effective reintegration also ensures that the needs of the 
recipient communities as well the needs of the individual are considered and met proportionately. 
A safe manner is defined as the ability of violent extremist offenders to reenter communities 
without facing violent retribution, as well as the basic security needs of communities are met. 
This process of effective reintegration also encompasses the success indicators outlined in 
Appendix 2. Appendix 3 outlines indicators that challenge the effectiveness of reintegration 
programming. The case studies will focus on each of the LCB countries’ Boko Haram 
reintegration programs and initiatives, as well as highlighting the existing roles of communities 
in the reintegration process, both positive and negative. Besides looking at country reintegration 
programs, each case study will also include information on civil society-led reintegration 
programs. By examining these reintegration programs and any form of community involvement, 
we can better understand the roles communities might play in the effectiveness of reintegration 
programs in the region, as well as in the process of reintegrating VEOs.  
In order to further assess the effectiveness of communities’ roles in reintegration 
processes, each case study will then be compared in the discussion section, as well as measured 
against both the success and challenge indicator checklists (found in Appendix 2 and 3 
respectively) constituting of common successes and challenges for reintegration programs in 
terms of communities’ roles and involvement in the processes. These checklists were created 
based on previous scholarship, included above, and case studies of other reintegration programs’ 
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experiences, as well as what the international community has professed as key guidelines and 
standards for reintegration and community-based reintegration. Indicators are inclusive of both 
positive and negative indicators that involve communities in reintegration processes and lead to 
either effective or ineffective programming. These checklists solely focus on community 
involvement indicators, as is within the scope of this research study. These checklists will be 
applied to the case studies in Appendix 2 and 3 to provide an overall snapshot in order to better 
understand the role communities can play in the effectiveness of reintegrating violent extremist 
offenders in the LCB. The ultimate goal of comparing these case studies and measuring against 
the checklists is to showcase the essential components of reintegration programs and the positive 
roles and pitfalls of communities and governments that may be useful for future effective 
programming in this unique and emerging DDR field of reintegrating VEOs in a fragile security 
context.  
As seen in the above literature review, communities have proven to play an essential role 
in the success or failure of reintegration programs. However, this research study’s hypothesis 
suggests that the involvement of communities is not being properly utilized or acknowledged 
within reintegration programs in the LCB countries, which has most likely led to ineffective 
reintegration programs of VEOs in the region. It is predicted that communities will play varying 
roles in each of the respective countries and that communities will also exhibit some significant 
challenges towards the effective implementation of reintegration programs. With the ever-
changing conflict dynamics and the difference in applying traditional DDR programs to the 
reintegration of VEOs and counterterrorism contexts, community involvement within 
reintegration programs may face significant roadblocks. It is expected that the LCB countries are 
not accounting for the success indicators of community involvement in their reintegration 
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programs. If the predicted hypothesis is wrong, it is expected that we will see that communities 
have had an entirely positive role on the effectiveness of reintegration programs of VEOs in the 
LCB countries and that these countries have incorporated more of the success indicators than 
challenge indicators.  
Data 
 
Below are the individual case studies on each of the LCB countries’ reintegration programs and 
initiatives. Each case study focuses on the role of communities in the reintegration processes in 
hopes of better understanding how they might factor in the effectiveness of reintegrating VEOs 
in the LCB region.  
 
Case Study on Nigeria 
 
As the epicenter of the Boko Haram conflict, Nigeria has been significantly impacted by 
the violence inflicted on communities by the terrorist group. In the past, Nigeria has 
implemented DDR programs for militants in the Niger Delta region. These programs, however, 
were ineffective as they only provided economic assistance to ex-combatants and failed to 
recognize the needs of affected communities.53 
In 2016, Nigeria created Operation Safe Corridor (OSC), a rehabilitation and 
reintegration program focused on reintegrating low-risk VEOs.54 This program is the only 
method for VEOs to leave the terrorist group and to be guaranteed reintegration, however the 
caveat is that they must be categorized as low-risk after surrendering to authorities. OSC 
provides programs such as psycho-social support, vocational training, and religious 
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reeducation.55 After its first 16-week program, 95 VEOs are currently ready to reintegrate back 
in communities, yet there is a stall in implementation.56 Despite being called a reintegration 
program, OSC does not have a clear reintegration strategy, which has led to a lack of support 
from communities and also a creation of fears from politicians that they will face intense 
backlash on pushing VEOs into these communities.57 Since reintegration is supposed to ensure 
the safe transition of VEOs back into communities, these VEOs are just waiting as the Nigerian 
government believes they will most likely face violent retribution upon return.58  
 In addition, this program has been critiqued by communities for its lack of transparency, 
as well as secrecy surrounding its reintegration guidelines, which there are none.59 The details on 
the initial screening process determining high or low risk are unclear to communities, but they 
know that high risk VEOs are sent to military detention and low risk VEOs are sent to 
rehabilitation and reintegration programs.60 The lack of transparency, due to security reasons, 
creates massive distrust towards the process from the recipient communities.61 The Nigerian 
government has mentioned it may try a general amnesty program for VEOs, but it has received 
feedback from communities that victims must be provided for ahead of VEOs.62  
 Also, OSC does not provide services for women and children. Another Nigerian program 
for reintegration is focused on reintegrating women and children VEOs in Maiduguri.63 Through 
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this program, around 1,800 women and children have been reintegrated back into communities, 
however they often face extreme stigmatization.64 
 
Roles of Nigerian Communities  
 
 Nigerian communities have played multiple roles in the reintegration processes, mainly 
through informal methods. One ad-hoc role communities have been playing in reintegration 
efforts is conducting traditional approaches and ceremonies of reconciliation and forgiveness. 
For example, the Sawari method is common in the Borno region, in which community leaders 
come together to collectively discuss whether a VEO can reintegrate based on the grievances and 
needs of the community as a whole.65 A positive outcome of this method is that women VEOs 
have been able to reintegrate back into communities through arranged marriages that attempt to 
build social ties.66 These traditional methods of reconciliation are common for Nigerian 
communities and allow them to play an active part in the ad-hoc reintegration processes. In a 
survey, 56% of community members suggested that they believe that VEOs can reconcile with 
victims and reintegrate into communities.67 Throughout this survey, results showed that more 
positive responses on reintegration came from communities that experienced a lower rate of 
violence.68 Communities also described potential methods that VEOs can achieve reconciliation 
and community acceptance, which included asking the community for forgiveness, asking 
forgiveness from God, and swearing an oath forgoing violence.69 
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 Based on the growth of ad-hoc community initiatives for reintegration, civil society 
organizations (CSOs) in Nigeria have played an active role in empowering communities to take 
positive stances and ownership on reintegration. With a gap in psycho-social support for victims 
of the conflict, a CSO called Carefronting worked to build the capacity of communities to act as 
first responders to cases of Boko Haram trauma.70 After this initiative, the CSO created a training 
manual for communities to knowledge-share methods of forgiveness and community 
reconciliation, assisting in the reintegration of VEOs.71 Another initiative that communities 
played a part in was a project by the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP). 
Through a WANEP project, local police and communities were trained in Nigeria on best 
practices of reintegration, through informal community dialogues.72 These dialogues allowed 
communities to express their hesitations towards the reintegration of VEOs, which led to 
sensitization campaigns for communities to better understand the overall benefits of 
reintegration.73 
 On the other hand, communities have played a challenging role to the reintegration of 
VEOs in Nigeria. In a different survey, around 40% of Nigerians within polled communities said 
they would never accept VEOs, whereas many others said it was just too soon to reintegrate as 
the conflict is ongoing.74 These communities’ main concern was that current reintegration 
programs offer exemption to VEOs’ crimes and offer no justice for the victims.75 Due to the 
extreme violence experienced in Nigeria and the military’s inability to stop it, vigilante groups 
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rose up within communities to protect populations and fight Boko Haram. Members of vigilante 
groups such as the Civilian Joint Task Force have expressed that they feel that VEOs are 
receiving more support than they are.76 The idea of violent retribution upon return to 
communities is a major hindrance towards reintegration in Nigeria.  
Of those VEOs that have returned to their communities, specifically women and children 
have faced intense stigmatization and rejection from recipient communities.77 These women and 
children are often seen by communities as a threat to the safety of its members who might 
become radicalized by them.78 On the community side, women community members in Yobe, 
Adamawa, and Borno regions showed that they are less likely to be willing to accept the 
reintegration of VEOs than their male counterparts.79 This may be due to the increased violence 
women faced at the hands of the terrorist group. Another issue for reintegration has been that 
communities are often not informed that VEOs were returning ahead of their arrival, which only 
further fueled stigmatization and a lack of community acceptance in Nigeria.80 Many Nigerians 
do not like the OSC program and view it as providing for VEOs while not supporting the needs 
of those communities suffering.81 Within this program there is a strict focus just on VEOs and 
not on preparing the communities to be adequate recipients of reintegration processes.  
 
Case Study on Cameroon 
 
Cameroon’s Far North region has been the area most impacted by Boko Haram in the 
country. Its population has a history of being marginalized and living in extreme poverty, which 
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made communities very susceptible to Boko Haram’s growing influence.82 The Far North region 
is the most populated within Cameroon, as well as the poorest with around 74.3% of the 
population living in poverty.83 In terms of formal reintegration programming, Cameroonian 
government initiatives have been small in comparison to Nigeria. Up until 2017, the 
government’s approach to combatting Boko Haram did not include any reference to reintegration 
planning even though VEOs were attempting to return to their communities.84 Many VEOs were 
captured on the battlefields and immediately placed in overcrowded Cameroonian prisons, such 
as in Maroua and Yaounde, awaiting to see whether there would be any judicial proceedings.85 
Throughout the beginning of the conflict, videos and news spread throughout communities 
showing Cameroonian security forces killing women and children because they were accused of 
being in Boko Haram.86 
During 2018 through a presidential decree, the Cameroonian government set up a 
National Committee for DDR (CNDDR), whose main goal is to “provide a framework for the 
reception and social reintegration” of both Boko Haram VEOs and other militants in the country 
supporting the Anglophone crisis.87 Along with the creation of CNDDR, President Paul Biya 
announced that VEOs who surrendered would be pardoned and reintegrated if they laid down all 
arms.88 These VEOs are referenced as ‘former fighters’ or ‘former associates’ within 
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Cameroon.89 The CNDDR’s mandate has been to create a way forward and to begin building 
centers for reintegration, specifically one in Mora for VEOs.90 These centers have experienced 
significant construction delays, which has overall slowed down the reintegration process.91 
Critics say that Cameroon’s CNDDR is poorly structured to reintegrate the increasing number of 
VEOs returnees.92 Even though Cameroon finally developed a reintegration process, there is 
little evidence that the committee prioritizes community involvement and the use of traditional 
restorative justice mechanisms that can enable the transition of VEOs back into their 
communities instead of further saturating prisons.93 
Roles of Cameroonian Communities  
 
 Despite the delay in forming an official reintegration program, Cameroonian 
communities have played many ad-hoc roles in creating informal reintegration processes. For 
example, Cameroonian communities have been utilizing traditional ceremonies of restorative 
justice, in which former VEOs publicly swear on a Quran confessing the atrocities they 
committed and renouncing all allegiances to Boko Haram.94 Some VEOs desperately wanted to 
reintegrate back into communities and began to approach traditional rulers and family members 
to help them negotiate their reentry back into the community in the absence of a clear 
government process.95 This has been occurring in large numbers, such as when 70 low-risk 
VEOs reintegrated back into their communities after they conducted the public ceremony.96 This 
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role in reintegration showcases the communities’ active participation in creating contextually 
relevant initiatives of reintegration in the place of the government. However, some community 
members have expressed that this type of public ceremony does not reduce their suspicions of 
VEOs.97 Some communities have been upset that VEOs appear to be getting off easy for their 
crimes and that the traditional ceremonies are not enough for what victims have endured within 
the conflict.98 
 Another significant role was initiated by the Cameroonian CSO Local Youth Corner 
Cameroon who established a program to build the capacity of youth to become agents of 
reintegration within communities.99 This program empowered youth to lead sensitization radio 
campaigns that encouraged communities to support reintegration processes and dispel 
misconceptions.100 This initiative is important because it utilizes youth in a positive way, unlike 
how Boko Haram targets youth to join its ranks. According to a UNDP assessment on 
community-based reintegration, Cameroon showcased a wider acceptance of reintegrating VEOs 
than the other LCB countries, especially in terms of reintegrating women and children.101 
 Even with the positive initiatives by communities, there have been some challenging 
roles exhibited by communities in terms of reintegration. Due to the lack of reintegration 
planning before 2017, many VEOs tried to defect from Boko Haram in Cameroon, but they were 
ultimately rejected by their communities upon return and sometimes even killed onsite by 
Cameroonian military forces, such as in the case of Kolofata.102 Reintegration has become a 
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difficult task due to intense suspicions towards VEOs by Cameroonian communities.103 For 
instance, in 2017 the leader of a group of 100 Boko Haram VEOs approached a traditional ruler 
in Mayo-Moskota for help on their reintegration, but was ultimately rejected by the local 
community.104 Even orphaned children of VEOs are often not welcomed back into communities 
despite the insistence of traditional rulers.105 
After Cameroon announced its reintegration plan, traditional rulers conducted awareness 
campaigns on reintegration in their communities.106 However, they experienced intense pushback 
from communities who do not want to accept VEOs or are afraid them. Those VEOs who are 
accepted back into communities are often shielded from others, in fear that they will experience 
violent retribution at the hands of community members.107 Similar to Nigeria, this is particularly 
true in Cameroon with the rise in vigilante justice. In terms of reintegration some community 
members in Maroa, stated that they were willing to kill returning VEOs if the government and 
security forces would not.108 Many vigilante groups emerged to fill the gaps of the state in the 
Far North, which may cause difficulties when attempting to reintegrate VEOs back into 
communities side by side with members of these informal security groups.109 
 
Case Study on Niger 
 
As Boko Haram’s violence and influence spread across the LCB region, Niger’s 
bordering region of Diffa began to feel the terrorist organization’s impact. Many owe the rise of 
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had a long history of being marginalized from the centralized government in Niamey.110 As the 
conflict began to spread closer to the capital, the Nigerien government issued a state of 
emergency, blocking motorcycle travel and the use of the Lake Chad and Komadougou river in 
the Diffa region, which angered communities who now were hindered economically within an 
increasing humanitarian crisis.111 This pushed communities, especially youth, to become more 
susceptible to the influence of the extremist group and to become further disillusioned with the 
Nigerien government.  
It is important to note that throughout its history, Niger has successfully implemented 
other post-conflict DDR programs such as reintegrating Tuareg ex-combatants, preventing a 
violent secession unlike its neighbor Mali.112 For example, according to the Africa Center for 
Strategic Studies, from 2006-2007 Niger was able to demobilize and reintegrate around 3,160 
individuals.113 However, from this number it is not evident the extent to which these individuals 
reintegrated effectively according to this paper’s definition.  
In terms of its Boko Haram reintegration programming, Niger announced in 2016 that it 
would begin to offer amnesty to those VEOs who would forgo radicalization and violence; in 
turn around 200 VEOs surrendered and now are being housed in a facility in Goudoumaria, 
Diffa.114 Based on the previous work of the Diffa region’s governor, Mahamadou Lawaly Dan 
Dano, Niger’s High Authority for Peace Consolidation set up a deradicalization and reintegration 
program at a camp in Goudoumaria for these Boko Haram VEOs defectors.115 Instead of facing 
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imprisonment like those captured by the Nigerien military, VEOs in Goudoumaria are promised 
food, security from retribution, deradicalization initiatives, and the ability to participate in 
programs that aim to ensure their successful reintegration back into communities.116 These VEOs 
are locally referenced as repentant or rehabilitated.117 Some believe that the amnesty program 
was established in Niger because the President recognized that many individuals, especially 
youth, joined Boko Haram because of the extreme poverty and underdevelopment in the border 
regions of Lake Chad.118 As of writing, it is very unclear whether any of the 200 VEOs in 
Goudoumaria have been reintegrated into their communities.  
Unlike the other LCB countries, Niger is the only country that systematically sorts all 
VEOs in custody to better understand their level of involvement in the terrorist organization.119 
This has resulted in those VEOs who have surrendered being sent to Goudoumaria or those who 
have been captured going to prisons and awaiting trials. Those VEOs that were captured by the 
Nigerien military, which amounts to almost 1,300 individuals, have been transferred to prisons 
throughout Niger.120 The vastly different number of VEOs in Goudoumaria to those awaiting 
trial has lessened the number of those Nigerien VEOs willing to surrender from Boko Haram, in 
fear that they will not receive true amnesty guaranteed by the government.121 However, the 
Nigerien government and judicial system has been hesitant to remove the process of detention 
for VEOs because they do not want to appear to the public as not recognizing the atrocities that 
victims have suffered.122 
Roles of Nigerien Communities  
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 Nigerien communities, particularly those living in the most impacted region of the 
conflict, have taken on varying roles throughout the reintegration process. Firstly, the 
government’s reintegration program came about because of the previous work of the Diffa 
governor. Dan Dano was actively working in the conflict-affected communities in the region to 
help create buy-in amongst community members for the reintegration of VEOs.123 Subsequently 
through his important work with communities, the High Authority for Peace Consolidation 
developed ‘peace committees’ that included mayors, traditional rulers, religious leaders, and 
other community members that meet to discuss important information regarding the ongoing 
military operations against Boko Haram, as well as how this impacts communities.124 These 
forums provided opportunities for communities to express any major concerns about the ongoing 
counterterrorism operations and the threat of Boko Haram in their communities, while at the 
same time building local buy-in between the communities and the local government 
authorities.125 This was very innovative as the presence of state authority has been very absent in 
the Diffa region.  
 As seen in the above example, traditional rulers and religious leaders hold significant 
power in all matters concerning Nigerien communities. One important role of communities in the 
reintegration of VEOs in Niger has been the exhibited through the role of traditional rulers. For 
example, in order to promote reconciliation and healing between returning VEOs and recipient 
communities, Nigerien traditional rulers have organized collective prayers, which aimed for both 
communities and individuals to come together and find strength in prayer and religion to 
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overcome the challenges both faced in terms of reintegration.126 Traditional rulers have been 
essential in disseminating information on the reintegration of VEOs and assessing the needs of 
the communities who have experienced trauma at the hands of these fighters.  
 Nigerien communities have also played a role through CSOs. A Nigerien CSO entitled 
Communautaire pour la Paix et la Promotion du Vivre Ensemble (COPAVE) conducted a study 
examining the best practices of DDR and community reconciliation from Cote d’Ivoire’s civil 
war, in order to mirror these successes in the program in Diffa.127 A key observation from this 
study was that the reintegration program needed to have a focus on communities’ needs to ensure 
that they also benefit from reintegration efforts.128 Afterwards, COPAVE began working with the 
National Human Rights Commission and Ministry of Interior to develop a reintegration action 
plan with the help of local traditional rulers to enhance the participation and ownership of 
communities in the process.129 This initiative not only brings community leaders to the forefront 
of planning and designing reintegration programs, but it also integrates community needs 
alongside those of the VEOs. However, it is unclear as to whether the reintegration action plan 
was ever formulated.  
Under a grant with the University of Diffa, some Nigerien academics have implemented 
programs to enhance communities’ role and ability in creating an enabling environment for the 
reintegration of VEOs. After a symposium occurred, inclusive of traditional, religious, and other 
community leaders, participants recognized the need to sensitize recipient communities in the 
Diffa region on the topic of community reconciliation.130 With support of the grant, 60 
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community members of the region were trained on the knowledge and best practices of 
reintegration, in hopes that they would go on to spread awareness to others in their 
communities.131 The idea of knowledge-sharing and spreading awareness on reintegration 
processes has proven to be useful in dispelling misconceptions as well as encouraging 
transparency between government run program and communities during times of ongoing 
counterterrorism campaigns.  
Despite the positive community roles mentioned above, there has been reports that many 
community members in Goudoumaria and the wider Diffa region are still resistant about the 
eventual reintegration of VEOs despite the multiple efforts to raise awareness and community 
acceptance.132 Originally, many community members were upset with the location of the camp 
near their homes, and some expressed that there is a perception that VEOs are receiving rewards, 
including economic assistance, whereas their communities are suffering from poverty.133 This 
hesitancy by communities will most likely remain a significant challenge for the reintegration 
process in Niger. Another challenging role that Nigerien communities play in the reintegration 
process is that some Nigerien communities are so ingrained with the Boko Haram insurgency 
that they live side by side with active VEOs, many who still live with their families.134 This is 
described as a result of a not having a legitimate whistle-blowing policy where community 
members could report VEOs and Boko Haram supporters who live within their community and 
not face a violent reaction.135 This complicated role of communities showcases how Boko Haram 
gained significant power while integrating within these communities in the periphery regions.  
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Overall in Niger there has a been a slow implementation process of reintegration and 
many of the VEOs who have surrendered are not receiving what they have been promised.136 A 
key issue for the effectiveness of this program has been gaining local support for reintegration 
from the conflict-affected communities.137 The Nigerien government has begun to strive to 
encourage outreach and awareness campaigns on the program in order to lessen discontent from 
local populations but it is yet to be seen how successful these efforts are.138  
 
Case Study on Chad 
 
From the outset of the conflict, the impact of Boko Haram in Chad was limited, until 
around 2015 when Chadian forces began supporting the military intervention in neighboring 
countries.139 Since the rise of Boko Haram, terrorist attacks in Chad have killed hundreds of 
people, internally displaced around 100,000 individuals, and destroyed most of the economy in 
the Lake region.140 Similar to Niger, the impact of Boko Haram has reverberated mainly in 
communities throughout the periphery Lac region of Chad, but it has never experienced the same 
levels of Boko Haram violence as its neighbors.141 Traditionally, this area of the LCB had a 
growing economy based in agricultural and fishing. The Lac region of Chad is not as 
geographically remote from state power as is the case with the other LCB countries, however this 
region still experienced marginalization throughout its history with the Chadian President 
visiting the lake for the first time ever in 2015.142 In the past, Chad has initiated multiple DDR 
programs including interventions focused on reintegrating child soldiers. For this program, with 
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the support of international partners, Chad conducted reintegration by providing payments of 
$830, psycho-social support, and vocational training for each individual.143 Nevertheless, the 
program was ineffective as many child soldiers returned to militancy.144 
In terms of current reintegration programming for VEOs, Chad is struggling on 
implementing a formal deradicalization and reintegration strategy.145 Compared to the other LCB 
countries, Chad has focused more on a military approach to fighting the terrorist group and has 
faced difficulties in implementing any softer components including strategies on reintegrating 
VEOs.146 Despite not having a reintegration program, Chad experienced an increase of 
surrenders in 2016 from Boko Haram, which amounted to 1,000 people mostly who were women 
and children.147 Of this number, 300 men are awaiting trial in the Baga Sola camps and the 
women and children have returned to their communities.148 It is unclear whether these women 
and children have successfully reintegrated into their communities based on the definition of 
effective reintegration in this paper. The Chadian government’s main reaction has been to 
imprison these male VEOs without clear guidance on when trials will occur. In addition, around 
1,000 VEOs are currently detained in the “Chadian Guantanamo” located in Koro Tore, where 
they are awaiting trials.149 International organizations have been pushing Chad to enact a 
reintegration plan and stressed that communities need to be a part of the design and planning 
phases in order for it to be effective.150 
Roles of Chadian Communities  
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Chadian communities have taken on varying roles, specifically in terms of the informal 
reintegration processes. According to an International Crisis Group report, the Chadian 
government suggested that it was having less  issues of reintegrating 1,000 former Boko Haram 
VEOs because the recipient communities had not been impacted by violence as much as those 
communities in Nigeria or Cameroon.151 However, this is very vague as it is unclear how many 
individuals have successfully reintegrated in Chad without a clear reintegration plan in place. 
Many of the VEOs returnees in Chad have been women and children. Chadian district 
administrators worked with their local communities, mainly throughout the Bol district, raising 
awareness and encouraging communities to welcome back these individuals.152 However, the 
same cannot be said for male VEOs looking to reintegrate in Chad.  
Communities played an additional role through a CSO entitled Youth Association for 
Peace and Non-Violence who initiated a program called “Sensitizing and Reinforcing 
Community Capacity in Rehabilitation and Reintegration of VEOs”.153 Through this program, 
the organization trained traditional rulers, religious leaders, and youth and women’s groups on 
the importance of reintegration and how the community can prevent recidivism in this process.154 
A positive outcome of this program was that CSOs were also trained to knowledge-share in 
Chadian communities on how reintegration works and to provide opportunities to discuss this 
subject.155 In a UNDP assessment with community focus groups, Chadian communities 
mentioned that family ties were the central component to be included in any future form of 
 
151 Cameroon’s Far North: A New Chapter in the Fight Against Boko Haram, report, International Crisis Group. 
152 Fighting Boko Haram in Chad: Beyond Military Measures, International Crisis Group. 
153 Nemr et al., It Takes A Village: 22.  
154 Ibid. 
155 Ibid.  
 
 34 
dialogue and reconciliation process of reintegrating VEOs. 156 Throughout this process, around 
400 individual community members received training.157   
 Despite the roles mentioned above, Chadian communities have played a largely 
challenging role with the government in terms of reintegration processes and instances relating to 
the VEOs. Even though district leaders have been raising awareness on reintegration, traditional 
rulers have also been experiencing violence by both Chadian state authorities and Boko Haram 
based on intimidation to see where their allegiance lies, or to see whether they are working with 
the terrorists, which resulted in the death of one traditional leader.158 To avoid being accused of 
being complicit with Boko Haram, many traditional rulers and religious leaders have vowed on 
Qurans in front of local governments to showcase their allegiance.159 This mistrust from the 
Chadian government towards the communities is spurred from the belief that they are possibly 
harboring terrorists.160 For example, the former governor of the Bol district reportedly allowed a 
suspected Boko Haram pregnant women to stay in his house, which led to him being removed 
from his position.161 At the same time, communities near the Lake are extremely skeptical of 
state authorities which may hinder any community influence on the potential reintegration 
process.162 This mistrust also allowed Boko Haram to increase its influence within this region of 
Chad. Because of this dual wariness, it is unlikely that communities will be open to work with 
the government and vice versa.  
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Due to increased levels of internally displaced people throughout the Lake region, 
Chadian communities have experienced a growth in communal violence and tensions over 
existing resources and over suspected allegiances with Boko Haram.163 Particularly, the Buduma 
ethnic group has faced increased stigmatization from other communities because of the rumor 
that they are complicit with Boko Haram.164 After the suicide attack in Baga Sola market in 
2015, some Buduma women were beaten up once it was announced that the suicide bomber was 
from this ethnic group.165 Inter-communal tensions may hinder a uniformed role of communities 
in supporting reintegration processes in Chad. Based on this assessment, it is clear that potential 
reintegration of VEOs into recipient communities may face some backlash due to stigmatization 
that they are cooperating or welcoming terrorists. However, the Chadian government has failed 
to establish a clear reintegration plan even though thousands of VEOs are ready to begin the 
reintegration process.  
Discussion 
 
 Based on above case studies, each of the LCB countries has approached reintegration 
differently, and communities have played a variance of roles in these processes. The predicted 
hypothesis is correct that the involvement of communities is not being fully utilized or 
capitalized upon within reintegration programs of VEOs in the LCB countries, which has led to 
less effective programming. This can be seen as the case studies are applied to the indictor 
checklists in Appendix 2 and 3 based on the success indicators and challenge indicators of 
community involvement. As seen in the case studies, communities have been playing a larger 
role in the reintegration process through more informal methods via leading community 
 





members such as tribal and religious leaders, as well as through CSOs. The role of communities 
within government-led programming was less evident in the case studies. In addition, as 
predicted, communities also played a significant challenging role towards the effective 
implementation of reintegrating VEOs in their countries.  
 In order to further examine the hypothesis, we must compare the above case studies as 
the LCB countries have experienced varying roles by communities within the reintegration of 
VEOs. As seen throughout the cases, communities played a small, almost non-existent role, 
within government-led programs on the reintegration of Boko Haram VEOs in all of the LCB 
countries. Communities in Niger seemed to have played the largest role in the government’s 
reintegration program of Goudoumaria, especially since the initiative was inspired by the Diffa 
region’s governor. Niger also had empowered key community leaders to take part in peace 
committees which attempted to build a connection from the communities to the government on 
key matters relating to Boko Haram, including reintegration. Despite there being a presidential 
decree on reintegration, there is little evidence that Cameroonian communities have played any 
official role via government-led programs on reintegration. In Nigeria, communities have had an 
impact on the OSC program, however this has been mainly through resistance due to the lack of 
transparency and distrust for not having a clear reintegration strategy. Lastly, Chadian 
communities played no role in this regard, as the Chadian government has not established an 
official reintegration program of Boko Haram VEOs. This proves that the involvement of 
communities has not been fully utilized or even acknowledged within reintegration programs of 
VEOs in the LCB region. This can be further seen in Appendix 2 that the LCB government 
programs have not utilized or acknowledged communities’ roles in reintegration to a large 
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extent.  The failure to include communities into formal reintegration processes means that the 
lack of community support can potentially derail the entire DDR program.166 
 However, as seen in the case studies, communities have played a more significant role 
informally in the reintegration of VEOs, increasing the effectiveness of this process. A major 
theme across the region was that communities played a role in initiating traditional ceremonies or 
restorative justice mechanisms to assist in the reintegration processes of VEOs. As seen in 
Nigeria and Cameroon, traditional ceremonies such as the Sawari method and swearing on the 
Quran have eased the reintegration of some VEOs. However, some community members have 
expressed their doubts in these methods. In addition, communities have played a major role via 
traditional rulers. In Niger, Nigeria, and Cameroon, traditional rulers have been at the forefront 
of building bridges and easing tensions between recipient communities and those who are 
reintegrating. To a lesser degree, traditional rulers have been less successful in Chad due to the 
skepticism from the government that they might be complicit with Boko Haram. Lastly, the case 
studies showed that local CSOs were a major component of community involvement in 
reintegration processes, as well as in building communities’ capacity to ensure effective 
reintegration. This is not surprising as CSOs have proven to have the most direct engagement 
with communities and have a history of building bridges between the government and 
communities.167 As seen in all four countries, CSOs have worked directly with communities on 
disseminating information, creating sensitization campaigns, building the capacity for 
reintegration, and providing psycho-social support for victims and perpetrators. These informal 
 
166 Through Our Eyes People’s Perspectives on Building Peace in Northeast Nigeria, report, Conciliation 
Resources, 7.  
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roles have filled the gap of community involvement within government-led programs and in turn 
have increased the effectiveness of informal reintegration processes.  
Despite these varying roles, communities have played a largely challenging role to the 
effective reintegration of VEOs in the LCB region. There are many reasons as to why this is 
occurring. For example, often communities are less likely to trust those who are reintegrating 
during situations of ongoing conflict.168 In addition, communities are the ones who set the rules 
of who belongs and does not belong in their community.169 At the same time, reintegration 
programming must not forget that these communities experienced extreme violence at the hands 
of Boko Haram throughout this conflict and to this day.170 Due to these reasons, communities 
have played a largely resistant role against reintegration. Communities in Nigeria and Cameroon, 
where most vigilante groups emerged during the conflict, have suggested that VEO returnees 
will face violent retribution when attempting to reintegrate because of the crimes they 
committed. This has stalled reintegration in both countries. Throughout the LCB region, 
communities have expressed that the needs of the victims need to be addressed before 
reintegrating VEOs, which has created further roadblocks to effective reintegration. In Chad, 
communities have been experiencing an increase in communal, ethnic violence over alleged 
allegiances with Boko Haram, hindering the ability to accept VEOs into communities. In 
addition, communities often stigmatize reintegrating VEOs, such as affiliated women and 
children, which has led to ineffective reintegration according to this paper’s definition. This 
significant role of limiting the effectiveness of reintegration can be seen in Appendix 3.  
 
168 Brechenmacher, Achieving Peace in Northeast Nigeria: The Reintegration Challenge, report, Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace.  
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Overall, the varying roles of communities within the reintegration of VEOs in the LCB 
showcases the importance of better understanding the roles of communities in the effectiveness 
of reintegration ex-combatants into this new unique context. Assessing the positive and negative 
roles of communities in this process can assist practitioners and governments to be able to 
develop methods and mechanisms to enhance the role of communities in the reintegration of 
VEOs within fragile security contexts with ongoing counterterrorism campaigns. Some 
limitations with these case studies are that each LCB was impacted vastly differently by Boko 
Haram and these communities’ range in different contexts and variations. No community is the 
same so it is difficult to showcase every communities impact on reintegration even within the 
same country.  
Recommendations 
 
Based on the above case studies that focused on the reintegration of VEOs in the LCB 
countries and the respective roles of communities in these programs, we can propose some 
recommendations. These particular cases, occurring in a unique DDR context, allow us to inform 
future programming and devise methods that communities’ roles can be utilized to improve and 
enable effective reintegration of VEOs in a similar context. These recommendations are 
particularly focused on the roles of communities. The following recommendations should be 
taken into consideration in order to increase the effectiveness of reintegrating VEOs in the LCB 
countries:  
• LCB countries, in partnership with community leaders such as tribal and 
religious, should conduct widespread awareness campaigns with communities on 
the ongoing reintegration processes of Boko Haram VEOs in their country. These 
awareness campaigns should include sensitization methods and should be as 
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transparent as they can be in the midst of ongoing counterterrorism operations. A 
key aspect of building awareness is also dispelling the misconception that VEOs 
are receiving rewards over the victimized communities, however this must go 
hand in hand with development projects for the conflict-affected communities and 
victims. The main goal of these campaigns is to gain buy-in and support from the 
communities, as well as raise awareness and clarify any misconceptions on the 
reintegration processes that the government is conducting. There is a potential that 
some communities will not want to participate. If this is the case, potentially the 
government could work with community members that are willing to collaborate 
in hopes of empowering them to become agents of change for the larger 
community; 
• Simultaneously, LCB country governments should work to build strong 
partnerships with recipient and conflict-affected communities in order to build a 
multi-faceted approach to reintegrating VEOs. Governments should utilize and 
capitalize upon the positive roles that communities have been exhibiting in 
reintegration processes, as discussed above. Communities should be empowered 
to have key roles in the reintegration of Boko Haram VEOs, however this must 
first begin with involving communities in the decision-making process on 
reintegration. At the same time, it is essential for men, women, and youth 
community members to have an active role in this process, in order to engage and 
incorporate the needs of the entire community. The main reason for this is that if 
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communities are involved in the implementation of reintegration from the 
decision-making point then they would be less likely to be resistant 171; 
• As seen in the case studies, CSOs have played an active role as enablers of 
reintegration and community reconciliation between communities and 
reintegrating VEOs in the LCB countries. It is recommended that LCB 
governments work in unison and collaborate with CSOs, whose innovative 
initiatives are already supporting reintegration. This will also remove the 
duplication of efforts and streamline all reintegration activities. In addition, LCB 
governments and international partners should work to build the capacity of these 
CSOs, who are at the forefront of reintegration and working directly with the local 
communities; and  
• Throughout previous DDR interventions, communities have proven to be an 
essential component in the successful reintegration of ex-combatants. Due to this 
fact, it is important for the capacities of communities to be built in order to 
become agents of creating an enabling environment for reintegration. Training 
can be provided to community leaders and members of communities to enable 
them to become recipients of reintegrating VEOs.  
Conclusion 
 
This research study aimed to better understand the roles communities play in the 
effectiveness of reintegration programs of VEOs in the LCB countries by utilizing case studies of 
the four countries and comparing the impact these roles have had on the effectiveness of 
 
171 Astrom and Ljunggren, DDR and Community Based Integration – How to Mitigate Stigmatisation of Former 
Combatants, report, Folke Bernadotte Academy: 10.  
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reintegration programming in the LCB. It is important to examine the effectiveness of 
reintegration in this region, particularly because of its unique security context of the need to 
reintegrate individuals during an ongoing counterterrorism campaign and the extent that 
communities have been impacted by the violence exhibited by Boko Haram. Based on these case 
studies, there are some evident roles communities have played in the effectiveness of 
reintegrating VEOs, such as playing a larger role in informal reintegration processes than formal 
government-led programs. Also, communities have played a largely resistant role to reintegration 
for many reasons. The implications of these outcomes showcase how the LCB countries can 
reform their programming to be more inclusive of communities and how they can capitalize upon 
existing local-led reintegration initiatives, such as traditional mechanisms, to increase the 
effectiveness of reintegration. With hopes of informing future programming, these case studies 
shine light on the essential components of effective reintegration programs and the way 





















Appendix 1: Terms and Definitions (alphabetical) 
 
Community-Based Reintegration: A type of approach to reintegration that provides greater 
inclusion of all social actors through the involvement of family members and communities of 
return in addition to the ex-combatant caseload. This approach supports ex-combatant 
reintegration as a component of wider community security, reconciliation, recovery, and 
development. In addition, it provides communities with the tools, training, and means to support 
and join the reintegration process.172  
 
Disarmament: The collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, 
explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian 
population.173 
 
Demobilization: The formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or 
other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of 
individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this 
purpose. The second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package provided to the 
demobilized, which is called reinsertion.174 
 
Effective Reintegration: Reintegration is considered effective when ex-combatants or violent 
extremist offenders can rejoin their communities in a safe manner and are able to reintegrate 
socially, politically, and economically. Effective reintegration also ensures that the needs of the 
recipient communities as well the needs of the individual are considered and met proportionately. 
This process of effective reintegration also encompasses the success indicators outlined in Figure 
2. A safe manner is defined as the ability of violent extremist offenders to reenter communities 
without facing violent retribution, as well as the basic security needs of communities are met. 
 
Reintegration: The process by which ex-combatants (or violent extremist offenders as in the 
case of this paper) acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. 
Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time frame, primarily 
taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country 
and a national responsibility and often necessitates long-term external assistance.175  
 
Violent Extremist Offenders (VEOs): In terms of this paper, VEOs are defined as those 
individuals (men, women, boys, and girls) who were associated with the terrorist organization 
Boko Haram and are in the process of attempting to reintegrate back into their communities. For 
ease of reference, this category will encompass individuals who were forced into the terrorist 
 
172 Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards, 160.  
173 Ibid, 25.  
174 Ibid.  
175 Ibid.  
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group, as well as those who voluntary joined. Each of the Lake Chad basin countries references 
this group with a different name and it will be mentioned in each of the case studies.  
 
 
Appendix 2: Indicator Checklist on Successes of Community Involvement in Implementing 




Nigeria Cameroon Niger Chad 
 Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal 
Safe transition of 
VEOs into 
communities 
        
Community 
acceptance of VEOs 
        
Psycho-social 
counseling provided 
for VEOs and 
victims within the 
community 





 X    X   
Building the capacity 





providing tools to 
support reintegration 
 X  X X   X 
Programs attempt to 
achieve a balance of 
addressing the needs 
of the community 
and of VEOs 
    X    
Programs contain a 
restorative justice 




 X  X X    
Rebuilding social 
bonds between the 
community and 
VEOs 
   X  X   
Programs account for 
the varying needs of 
men, women, boys, 
and girls both of 







involvement in the 
reintegration process 
 X  X X   X 
 
Appendix 3: Indicator Checklist on Challenges of Community Involvement in 
Implementing Effective Reintegration Programs  
 
Challenge Indicator Nigeria Cameroon Niger Chad 
Increased levels of 
community resentment 
and stigma towards VEOs 
X X X X 
Communities interfering 
with the reintegration of 
VEOs 
X X  X 
Communities’ lack of 
knowledge on 
reintegration process 
leading to misconceptions 
 
X   X 
Perceptions of appropriate 
punishment of VEOs does 
not match communities’ 
expectations 
X X   
Economic assistance to 
VEOs at the expense of 
the communities 
X  X  




X X X X 
Safe transition of VEOs 
into communities is 
unlikely 
X X  X 
Lack of community 
involvement or ownership 
throughout the 
reintegration process 
X X  X 
Programs do not account 
for variance in the needs 
of men, women, boys, and 
girls both of VEOs and 
communities 
 X X X 
Lack of transparency 
about government run 
reintegration programs of 
VEOs with the 
communities  
X    
Programs do not include a 
social reintegration 
component 
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